

## Message Text

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

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R 191346Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1289

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 1108

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 0494

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: Q'S AND A'S BY CZECH AMBASSADOR KLEIN,

PRESS CONFERENCE, JAN 17, 1974

SUMMARY:

THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL RECORD OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS BY CZECHOSLOVAK REP KLEIN SPEAKING FOR WARSAW PACT IN PRESS CONFERENCE JANUARY 17 ARE FORWARDED FOR INFORMATION. ANSWERS, DELIVERED IN CZECH AND POORLY TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, HAVE BEEN EDITED WITHOUT LOSS OF SUBSTANCE. END SUMMARY.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Q. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 14 THAT WAS GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR QUARLES, ELICITING MANY COMMENTARIES FROM THE WESTERN PRESS, HE EXPRESSED A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TOWARD INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, DUE TO THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SUCH A PROCESS. WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE ON THIS PROBLEM?

A. AS I HAVE ALREADY NOTED IN MY STATEMENT, CAPABILITY OF EACH MODERN ARMY IS SUBSTANTIALLY BASED ON THE WORKING TOGETHER OF ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMS. IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE NOT ONLY WITH GROUND FORCES, BUT ALSO WITH MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, WHICH SAY CLEARLY IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT IN VIENNA WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT NOT ONLY ON THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO OUR OPINION, TO EXCLUDE SUCH KINDS OF ARMS AS MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE CONCENTRATION OF WHICH IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS REALLY GREAT, IS REALLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE LOGIC OF A COMPLEX REDUCTION. I THINK IT IS NO SECRET FOR ANYONE THAT CONTEMPORARY MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAVE A GREAT ATTACK CAPABILITY, AND, MOREOVER, THEY ALSO HAVE MOBILITY. FURTHERMORE, IT IS NECESSARY TO RECKON WITH THE FACT THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE ABLE TO CARRY AND TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND THAT IS ACTUALLY THE CASE: THAT IS THE MAIN MEANS OF ATTACK IN EVERY MODERN ARMY. TOGETHER WITH THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE GROUND FORCES, THE GREATEST THREAT IS REPRESENTED, IN OUR OPINION, BY THESE WEAPONS TO THE AREAS OF CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THAT IS ANOTHER REASON WHY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE INCLUSION OF THESE ARMS IN THE REDUCTIONS. I THINK THAT THE APPREHENSIONS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL KINDS OF ARMS WOULD BE COMPLICATED ARE UNFOUNDED. ALREADY IN THE COMMUNIQUE

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WHICH RESULTED FROM THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS RECKONED WITH THE COMPLICATED ASPECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. I QUOTE FROM THE COMMUNIQUE: "THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE AGREED, THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE UNDER-TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY, THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH SHOULD BE USED TO SOLVE THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMPLICATED

ASPECTS OF THOSE QUESTIONS." MOREOVER, I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY, THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE, IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT, PROPOSED THE METHODS AND THE WAYS OF HOW TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN IN THAT RESPECT MUTUAL AGREEMENTS ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX PROBLEM.

2. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, YOU MENTIONED ON PAGE THREE OF YOUR WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT REDUCTION ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS BY THE TWO SIDES IS IN "OUR OPINION THE KEY FOR THE JUST SOLUTION" OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. YOU OMMITED TO MENTION THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES ARE MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE AS WELL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW YOU ENVISION SOME KIND OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES, SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS, VERIFICATION, CONTROL OF TROOP MOVEMENTS?

A. I THINK THAT THE QUESTION WAS PUT IN SUCH A WAY WITH REGARDS TO THE COMMUNIQUE, WHERE IT SAYS THAT WE SHALL NEGOTIATE ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, AND WITH THE METHOD OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES. NATURALLY, ANY MEASURES IN THAT RESPECT SHOULD REALLY BE CONNECTED WITH THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, AND ONE SHOULD NOT MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN OTHER DIRECTIONS THAN

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R 191346Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1290

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INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR/SHAPE  
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THAT OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES. I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE QUESTION OF THESE MEASURES CAME UP IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT TOO HAVE SOME SUCH ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH ARE REALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, FOR INSTANCE, A MEASURE SUCH AS INFORMATION ABOUT THE START OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION, AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE TERMINATION OF THE PROCESS, AND SO ON. AS FAR AS THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION IS CONCERNED, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES NATURALLY ALSO RECKON WITH VERIFICATION MEASURES, WHICH HAVE BEEN ANCHORED IN OUR PROPOSAL, AND CONTROL MEASURES, WHICH TO THE FULL EXTENT CAN SECURE THE ADHERING TO THE AGREEMENT. BUT, SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT SPOKEN IN DETAIL OF THESE QUESTIONS IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BECAUSE, NATURALLY, WE MUST FIRST OF ALL AGREE ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF REDUCTIONS, AND WE SHALL IN THAT CONNECTION ALSO PROCEED TO THE QUESTIONS OF CONTROL. THEREFORE, I DON'T FIND IT NE-  
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CESSARY TO SPEAK IN MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE QUESTION.

3. Q. THE WESTERN SIDE SAYS THAT THE EASTERN SIDE HAS 150,000 MEN MORE IN GROUND FORCES AND 6,000 (SIC) TANKS MORE IN TANK FORCES. NOW, MY QUESTION: WHAT IS THE EASTERN ARGUMENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THIS PREPONDERANCE?

A. THIS IS THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE UNFORTUNATE DISPARITIES, WHICH HAVE SUDDENLY BEEN MENTIONED IN THE WEST. I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT THIS IS A QUESTION PUT IN AN ARTIFICIAL WAY, WHEN AN EQUILIBRIUM OF ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN CREATED IN EUROPE, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE STABLE SITUATION IN THIS AREA. THE PROOF OF THIS STABILITY IS THE FACT, THAT EUROPEAN AND OTHER STATES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SOLVING MANY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS OF EUROPE, WHICH WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE PRIOR TO THAT. AND THEN, A CLEAR PROOF OF THIS STABLE SITUATION, IS THE FACT THAT NOW THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IS UNDERWAY. IN THIS CONNECTION I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT THIS IS NOT ONLY OUR OWN EVALUATION. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MR. SCHLESINGER, IN AN INTERVIEW ON JANUARY 7, 1974, DECLARED--AND HE HAD IN MIND THE BORDER ON THE ELBE--THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING WHICH IS CLOSE TO AN EQUILIBRIUM

IN NUMBERS. HE SAID THAT WE ARE ON A LITTLE LOWER LEVEL THAN THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY, BUT THAT HE HAD OTHER POSSIBILITIES COMPENSATING FOR IT, SO AS TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPE THIS EQUITY OF FORCES. OR NOT TO TAKE WHAT SOMEBODY MIGHT SAY IS THE VIEW OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FROM A COUNTRY BEYOND EUROPE, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MR. LEBER, IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE WEST GERMAN PERIODICAL "DIE ZEIT" OF JULY 8, 1973 SAID THAT THE RATIO OF FORCES DOES NOT BOTHER HIM, AND THAT HE MAY SAY WITH GOOD CONSCIENCE THAT THEY CAN FEEL SECURE AS A RESULT. HE NATURALLY HAD THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN MIND. ANSWERING THIS QUESTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT IT ISN'T JUST THE QUANTITY THAT IS DECISIVE, THAT IS TO SAY 100 SOLDIERS OR 1,000 SOLDIERS, OR ONE BRIGADE OF ONE KIND OF TROOPS LESS OR MORE, BUT THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF ARMED FORCES AND COMPENSATED, FOR INSTANCE, BY THE QUALITY OF ARMAMENTS, BY THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF ARMAMENTS. AND, NATURALLY, ON KIND OF ARMAMENT SYSTEM MAY BE COMPENSATED BY ANOTHER KIND OF ARMAMENT SYSTEM. SO THE ONLY CORRECT VIEW OF THE ARMED FORCES IS, SO TO SAY, THE COMPLEX OF ALL ARMS CATEGORIES. AND TOGETHER WITH MR. SCHLESINGER WE MAY SAY

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THAT THERE IS AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES IN THIS AREA. THAT IS WHY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE SUGGESTED MAINTAINING THE EXISTING RATIO OF ARMED FORCES, WHICH PROVIDES NOT ONLY FOR STABILITY IN EUROPE, BUT ALSO FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES; THIS CORRESPONDS TO THE TREND OF THE GENERAL RELAXATION OF TENSION IN EUROPE.

4. Q. IN CASE, MR. AMBASSADOR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE TALKS, DOES THAT IMPLY THAT YOU WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS ALSO THE INTERMEDIARY RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES STATIONED ON SOVIET TERRITORY?

A. NOT AT ALL. I SHOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION BY SAYING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA RELATE TO AN AREA WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN LIMITED, THAT IS TO THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. AND WE OURSELVES HAVE NO RIGHT TO EXTEND THIS AREA.

5. Q. WHILE THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON BEFORE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED, IS THE WARSAW PACT MAINTAINING ANY KIND OF A FREEZE ON THE NUMBERS OF TROOPS OR TANKS IN THIS AREA, OR DO YOU FEEL FREE TO INCREASE THE NUMBERS, AND PERHAPS INCREASE YOUR OVER-ALL STRENGTH?

A. I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT NO AGREEMENT ON A FREEZE WAS REACHED, AND WE HAVE NOT NEGOTIATED ON A FREEZE EITHER SO FAR. SO THAT I THINK IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY MORE TO THIS QUESTION

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USNMR/SHAPE

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UNDER THE GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. Q. YOU HAVE THE TWO SETS OF PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. APPARENTLY THEY ARE CONTRADICTORY. IS THE AMBASSADOR ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY COMMON ELEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES?

A. I SHOULD NOT VENTURE TO IDENTIFY ANY COMMON ELEMENTS OF THE TWO AGREEMENTS, BECAUSE YOU KNOW YOURSELF, THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENTS WERE SUBMITTED IN AUTUMN LAST YEAR, AND NOW THERE IS A LIVELY DISCUSSION GOING ON ON THE INDIVIDUAL POINTS OF THESE AGREEMENTS; A DISCUSSION WHICH REVEALS SOMETIMES WHAT IS BEHIND (THE CONCEPTS?). I MAY SAY ONE THING: I THINK WE HAVE AGREED, WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THAT IS TO SAY, WE HAVE AGREED UPON THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE WHERE THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT. ONE MIGHT ALMOST SAY THAT SOME APPROACHES ARE NOT TOO REMOTE, BUT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE.

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7. Q. THE NATO PROPOSALS PROVIDE IN THE FIRST PHASE A DISCUSSION ON THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDUCTION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. DO YOU THINK THIS IS A POSSIBILITY?

A. IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING: THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEMAND THAT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WOULD EFFECT BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT MUTUAL REDUCTIONS SHOULD AFFECT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; FOR INSTANCE THE PROTOCOL OF MAY 14, CLEARLY REFERS TO THE POTENTIAL PARTIES TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT. THAT IS TO SAY, TO ELEVEN COUNTRIES, AND NOT ONLY TO TWO COUNTRIES. THIS IS, I SHOULD SAY, ONLY A FORMAL, A LEGAL ARGUMENT. THERE IS ALSO A PRACTICAL SIDE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE, OR POINT OF VIEW, THE NATIONAL AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN BOTH GROUPINGS IN EUROPE REPRESENT ONE WHOLE. ALL ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ARMIES IN THIS AREA ARE BASED ON CLOSE MUTUAL COOPERATION, AND ACTUALLY THEY REPRESENT AN INSEPARABLE COMPLEX. IT IS ALSO GENERALLY KNOWN, THAT THE NUMBER OF NATIONAL FORCES IS QUITE CONSIDERABLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HERE I SHOULD LIKE TO REFER TO MR. RUSH, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO ON JULY 10, 1973, SAID THAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES HAD 25 OUT OF 29 NATO DIVISIONS. AND THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FOR INSTANCE, IS THREE TIMES GREATER THAN THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN THAT AREA. AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REACHES SOME 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NATO FORCES IN THAT AREA. IF WE EXCLUDE IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THE NATIONAL FORCES, THE NUMBER OF WELL-ARMED NATO FORCES WOULD REMAIN UNTOUCHED. WE HAVE NOW BEEN WITNESSING THE GRADUAL REDUCTION OF TENSION, WHICH SHOULD RESULT FOR THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AMONG OTHER THINGS IN A CONSIDERABLE RELAXATION OF THE BURDEN OF EXPENDITURES, AND WE ASK WHY ONLY SOME COUNTRIES SHOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES BECAUSE OF THIS RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, AND WHY SOME OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD ONLY STAND BY AND OBSERVE THIS PROCESS. FOR INSTANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARRIVED IN VIENNA AS AN ASSOCIATED PARTY TO THE FUTURE AGREEMENTS. THUS IT COULD BE SAID THAT THERE IS SOME SORT OF DISCRIMINATION, BECAUSE WE ARE THERE ONLY IN THE ROLE OF SOME KIND OF OBSERVER.

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8. Q. I WAS WONDERING, MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU HAVE REFERRED TO SO MANY QUOTES FROM THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, ONLY THE SENTENCES YOU READ HERE ALOUD - SENTENCES - OR IF YOU HAVE THE INTEGRAL TEXT HERE. BECAUSE IF YOU HAVE THE INTEGRAL

TEXT, IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HAVE YOUR COMMENTS ON OTHER PARTS. FOR INSTANCE, IN MR. LEBER'S ARTICLE, AND I HAVE IT IN MY ARCHIVES, YOU WILL RECALL HE DID NOT SPEAK ONLY OF SECURITY, BUT ALSO OF DANGERS TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE CONSIDERABLE BUILDUP OF SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES EVEN DURING RECENT MONTHS, MEANING THE FIRST HALF OF '73. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT? AND MY SECOND QUESTION IS: YOU WERE COMPLAINING ABOUT "DISCRIMINATION" DURING THE TALKS. DOES THIS AFFECT THE ENTIRE CZECH POLICY, OR ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I SHOULD LIKE TO START FROM THE OTHER END. I THINK THAT MY REMARK RELATED TO DISCRIMINATION WAS UNDERSTOOD, WELL, AS A KIND OF JOKE, AND I THINK THAT EVERYBODY UNDERSTOOD WHAT I HAD IN MIND IN THAT RESPECT. AS FAR AS MR. LEBER'S STATEMENT IS CONCERNED IT IS A LONG STATEMENT, AND THERE ARE CERTAINLY MORE THINGS TO WHICH WE CANNOT AGREE, BUT IT WAS CERTAIN FOR US THAT AS FAR AS THE GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION, THE OVERALL SITUATION IN EUROPE IS CONCERNED, HERE IS THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WHO FEELS SECURE. AS FAR AS THE MENTIONING OF THE INCREASE OF NUMBERS OR SHIFTING TROOPS AND SO ON,

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I THINK THAT HERE THEY START FROM THE SITUATION AND POSTIONS OF ONE SIDE. NATURALLY, SOMETIMES THESE DATA ARE NOT SO PRECISE, BECAUSE THE OTHER SIDE IS INVOLVED. I THINK THAT AS JOURNALISTS YOU KNOW VERY WELL HOW OFTEN THESE NUMBERS HAD BEEN ALTERED. I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT IN THE LAST PERIOD, SINCE AUTUMN, SINCE WE HAD OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, WE HAD FOUND SO MANY DIFFERENT NUMBERS IN THE WORLD PRESS AS FAR AS SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND CONCERNED, THAT IF EVERY TIME WHAT WAS WRITTEN WERE CORRECT, THERE WOULD BE AN ENORMOUS SHIFTING OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE ROADS WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO TRANSPORT ALL THESE FORCES. FOR INSTANCE, MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE, MR. QUARLES, STATED A FEW DAYS AGO THE NUMBER OF GROUND TROOPS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY WERE 777,000--THAT

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IS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES. AND IF YOU READ IN THE PRESS THE NUMBERS CONTAINED IN THE WHITE BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IT WAS IN YESTERDAY'S PAPER--802,000 TROOPS ARE STATIONED THERE. I SHOULD LIKE TO REPEAT WHAT I ALREADY SAID AT THE BEGINNING, THAT THESE NUMBERS TAKEN OUT FROM THE WHOLE COMPLEX, CANNOT GIVE US THE WHOLE PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. AND I THINK THAT ALL DELEGATES TAKING PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS KNOW THE STATE OF AFFAIRS VERY WELL, AND THAT IN THE COURSE OF CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS WE WILL BE ABLE TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION.

9. I HAVE ONLY A VERY SHORT TECHNICAL QUESTION. MR. QUARLES VON UFFORD IS THE SPOKESMAN OF THE WESTERN SIDE. HOW IS IT ON THE EASTERN SIDE - WILL YOU BE THE SPOKESMAN, OR WILL IT ROTATE?

A. WE, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, REGARD THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, AND WE HAVE NO SPEAKER FOR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. MR. STRULAK WAS SPEAKING HERE LAST TIME; HE WAS SPEAKING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. MR. STRULAK IS OUR SO-CALLED OFFICER OF CONTACT, AS FAR AS PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ON THE CONFERENCE ARE CONCERNED, WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA. THIS IS ONLY IN ORDER TO MAKE THE PROCEDURES OF THE CONFERENCE EASIER. I AM SPEAKING HERE TODAY AS THE HEAD OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION, ALTHOUGH I MUST SAY THAT

MANY VIEWS I EXPRESSED HERE ARE SHARED BY OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY BY OUR CO-AUTHORS (OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL).

10. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, SOME SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE PROLONGED THE COMPULSORY SERVICE OF THEIR MILITARY FORCES. DO YOU THINK THAT THIS FACT IS IN ACCORD WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS CONFERENCE?

A. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT THIS QUESTION WAS NOT PUT BEFORE, AND WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT OUR CONFERENCE, AND I THINK THAT WE ARE NOT YET SO FAR TO BE ABLE TO PROCEED TO SUCH A QUESTION.

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11. Q. COULD YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT TODAY'S SESSION?

A. I CAN SAY THAT THE CHAIRMAN WAS THE AMBASSADOR OF CANADA AND NOT THE AMBASSADOR OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS IT WAS STATED IN THE PRESS AND ON THE RADIO. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION SPOKE, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA. NATURALLY, EVERY OPENING SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW YEAR ESSENTIALLY REVIEWS THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN AUTUMN, AND OUTLINED THE WAY OF THE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE QUESTIONS LYING AHEAD OF US. THAT IS ALL I CAN SAY SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS.

12. Q. HOW LONG WAS THE SESSION TODAY?

A. ONE HOUR

13. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, IN VIEW OF WHAT YOU SAID ABOUT THE FIGURES IN THE NATO STATEMENT, WOULD YOU CARE TO GIVE US YOUR OWN FIGURES OF THE FORCES ALIGNED ON BOTH SIDES?

A. I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO SPEAK OF NUMBERS BEFORE THESE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED I THINK THAT SOMETIMES IT IS OF NO HELP WHEN SOME PARTIAL NUMBERS ARE DISCUSSED IN PUBLIC; IT MAY BE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT MISLEADING FOR THE WORLD PUBLIC. THEREFORE PERMIT ME NOT TO DEAL WITH CONCRETE FIGURES TODAY.

14. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, I DETECT THAT YOUR SILENCE MEANS THAT YOU AGREE WITH THE FIGURES THAT WERE RELEASED BY THE PRESS?

A. I DID NOT SAY THAT. I THINK THAT THIS KIND

OF QUESTION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS,  
AND I THINK WE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO FIND THE RIGHT  
NUMBER.

15. Q. DESPITE THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF TODAY'S  
FIRST PLENARY MEETING, MAY I ASK WHETHER YOU DID  
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HAVE ELECTRIC LIGHT, OR DID YOU HOLD YOUR MEETING  
IN THE DARK?

A. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE IT BY  
CANDLELIGHT, BUT WE DID HAVE ELECTRIC LIGHT.

16. Q. COULD I ASK, SIR, HOW YOU SEE THIS STAGE OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDING? DO YOU EXPECT PLENARIES  
TWICE A WEEK AS THEY WERE IN THE AUTUMN, OR DO YOU  
EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE FEWER PLENARIES AND MORE  
PRIVATE MEETINGS? DO YOU EXPECT BILATERAL MEETINGS?  
WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE WORKING PATTERN?

A. WE HAVE STARTED, AND WE HAVE STARTED IN A WAY  
SIMILAR TO THAT IN AUTUMN. PERHAPS, IN THE COURSE  
OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL BECOME NECESSARY EITHER TO  
HAVE MORE OR FEWER PLENARIES. NATURALLY, THIS WILL  
BE AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND  
CERTAINLY WE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH A METHOD FOR NEGOTIA-  
TION WHICH WILL HELP US TO SOLVE TECHNICALLY ALL  
THE QUESTIONS LYING AHEAD OF US. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMED FORCES, ARMS, AGREEMENT DRAFT, PRESS CONFERENCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, TROOP REDUCTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 JAN 1974  
**Decapton Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decapton Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
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**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: Q'S AND A'S BY CZECH AMBASSADOR KLEIN, PRESS CONFERENCE, JAN 17, 1974  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, WARSAW PACT  
**To:** STATE  
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